亚色影库app

An open access publication of the 亚色影库app & Sciences
Fall 2025

Colonialism Turned Inward: Importing U.S. Militarism into Local Police Departments

Authors
Azadeh N. Shahshahani and Sof铆a Ver贸nica Montez
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Abstract

Policing in the United States has become increasingly militarized, partly due to the transfer of military equipment to local police departments. Many law enforcement agencies throughout the United States have also received training in population-颅control tactics from Israel. Armed with these tools and tactics, police agencies often use excessive force against grassroots protesters resisting state repression. Across the country, proposals for urban warfare training centers, commonly known as Cop Cities, are on the rise. At the same time, the federal legal code for terrorism drafted to suppress domestic solidarity with Palestinian liberation has been weaponized, increasing the opportunities for police to victimize protesters. The struggle against increasingly militarized state force is intimately related to the Palestinian fight against settler colonialism. Awareness of this international connection is essential to combatting the offenses led or supported by Western imperialism.

Azadeh N. Shahshahani is the Legal and Advocacy Director at Project South, which connects legal and advocacy work and movement lawyers with grassroots organizations with a focus on immigrants鈥 rights and defending Muslim communities against state repression. She is a former President of the National Lawyers Guild. She has published in such journals as The City University of New York Law Review, Michigan Journal of Race and Law, and University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Social Change.

Sof铆a Ver贸nica Montez is a Staff Attorney at Project South and a 2023 graduate of the University of North Carolina School of Law. They have published in such journals as In These Times and The Human Rights Brief.

Aim茅 C茅saire observed that the colonialism of Western Europe, surpassed in his view by that of the United States, tends to return to the motherland 鈥渂y a terrific boomerang effect.鈥 The 鈥渃olonizer, who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing the other man as an animal . . . tends objectively to transform himself into an animal.鈥1 U.S. imperial expansionism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries required local policing in the colonized areas. This led to developments in domestic policing.2

From their inception as slave patrols, U.S. police have fundamentally served to enforce a domestic colonial order and white supremacy. Since the 1990s, U.S. military resources developed for combat and police tactics imported from abroad have been deployed by local law enforcement agencies (LEAs).3 These militarized practices have disproportionately targeted Black communities.4 Further, as associate professor of criminology, law, and justice A. Naomi Paik asserts, 鈥渞acism is central to the U.S. settler colonial project that seeks to exclude and remove anyone who does not fit the ideal settler community鈥攐ne based not only in a white racial identity, but also property ownership, patriarchal gender norms, and health and ability, among multiple factors.鈥5 The most heavily militarized policing, charges of domestic terrorism, and surveillance have been deployed against the Black Lives Matter movement, people who have supported Palestinians, and protestors against the militarization of police.

In line with Robert Jay Lifton鈥檚 argument in this volume, we contend that U.S. wars not only beget other wars but foster human rights violations and the militarization of policing at home and abroad. The police killing of Michael Brown in 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri, drew national attention to the fear and anger of a Black community facing militarized LEAs and the deaths of hundreds of Black lives each year. Democratic Congresswoman Cori Bush of Missouri stated on the floor of the U.S. Congress in 2021 that 鈥渢he same equipment that they used to brutalize us is the same equipment that we send to the Israeli military to police and brutalize Palestinians.鈥6 As the movement for Black lives evolved into the 2020 uprisings following the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police, protesters nationwide experienced police repression.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 1033 Program is a prime instance of U.S. military power intruding into local life.7 Named after section 1033 of the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act, the Clinton-era program authorizes the U.S. Secretary of Defense to transfer DOD property to state and local LEAs for 鈥渓aw enforcement activities,鈥 preferably 鈥渃ounter-drug and counter-terrorism activities鈥 in alignment with the ongoing wars on drugs and crime.8

As of the early 2020s, the DOD had transferred over $7 billion worth of supplies to almost ten thousand LEAs, including local and university police.9 LEAs must submit a justification for their requests, typically offering such generic reasons as 鈥溾楩OR ACTIVE SHOOTERS,鈥 鈥楩OR HIGH RISK OPERATIONS,鈥 鈥楬IGH RISK WAR RANTS,鈥 and 鈥楥OUNTER DRUG.鈥欌 Even towns with only a few thousand residents have LEAs armed with mine-resistant vehicles, sniper equipment, and sound cannons. The supplies range from office goods to 鈥渃ontrolled property,鈥 including military weaponry, aircraft, and armored vehicles.10

These weapons are routinely used for Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) raids against civilians鈥攕ubverting the purported purpose of SWAT to specifically combat extremism鈥攁nd have featured in the police crackdowns at Occupy Wall Street in 2011, the Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests in 2014, the Dakota Access Pipeline in 2017, and the nationwide uprisings against anti-Black police brutality in 2020.11 Some LEAs have amassed such a vast arsenal that they have donated their surplus to the armed forces in Ukraine.12 Former New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg once bragged about having 鈥渢he seventh biggest army in the world鈥 in the New York City Police Department (NYPD).13

Moreover, the militarization of LEAs countrywide disrupts and threatens not only protest-related activities but the lives and livelihoods of marginalized communities. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has documented various ways in which LEAs victimize community members with unjustifiable violence: a SWAT raid burning a baby in his crib in the course of trying to stop a $50 narcotics transaction; an officer accidentally shooting and killing a grandfather in his own home while pursuing a man domiciled elsewhere; a widespread trend to shoot household pets.14 These incidents reflect how police militarization 鈥渁gainst (perceived/potential) threats . . . increases the amount of threat perceived by the police [and] their capacity to respond to those threats violently.鈥15

The first major attempt to limit the transfer of military equipment to local LEAs was Executive Order (EO) 13688, signed by President Obama in early 2015. This action came as a result of the militarized police response to the 2014 Ferguson uprising, which followed the murder of eighteen-year-old Michael Brown by a Ferguson Police Department (FPD) officer.16 Military veterans were shocked that the FPD was more heavily armed than they had been in Iraq and Afghanistan.17 The militarized repression was broadcast worldwide, revealing the alarming capabilities of the U.S. police.18 EO 13688 created the Law Enforcement Equipment Working Group鈥攚hich included officials from the DOD, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)鈥攖hat advocated banning transfers of grenade launchers, tracked armored vehicles and other equipment, and recommended increased oversight for certain items.19

Before President Trump revoked it in 2017, community advocates had criticized the limited effectiveness of EO 13688.20 The ACLU determined that the restrictions 鈥渨ere too narrow in scope,鈥 such as covering vehicles that were tracked, armored, and manned but excluding vehicles that met only one or two of these criteria. In fact, EO 13688 applied to less than 0.5 percent of controlled equipment. Some prohibited equipment continued to be issued, and some banned items already in circulation were not recalled. Overall, no more than 0.1 percent of all equipment transfers was actually recalled.21

The most substantial restriction on the 1033 Program to date was President Biden鈥檚 EO 14074, which gave executive officials the authority to grant or prohibit transfers of select items including grenades, grenade launchers, and weapons and ammunition exceeding .50 caliber.22 But EO 14074 ultimately failed to meaningfully curb the dangers of the 1033 Program, and would share a fate with its predecessor, Obama鈥檚 EO 13688: Trump revoked the order on the day of his second inauguration, January 20, 2025.

Further, for local LEAs, the 1033 Program is sometimes not even the primary source of military-grade supplies.23 Its benefit lies in its expediency, delivering in months the same equipment that it would take years for other sources to provide.24 If the 1033 Program were eliminated, agencies could still purchase supplies from private vendors using funds from their own budgets or funds from private police foundations, the DOD鈥檚 1122 Program, the Byrne Justice Assistance Grant, the DHS Urban Areas Strategy Initiative, and civil forfeitures.25 In fact, at least one agency has boasted that it has successfully replaced all its 1033 equipment via alternative sources after ending its participation in the program.26

During the Cold War, foreign military and police departments in Latin America that were notorious for violence, torture, and disappearances were often trained by the U.S. military at the Army School of the Americas (later renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation).27 The United States continues to fund and train foreign police forces and militaries in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.28 But this is a two-way street. The U.S. government offers hundreds of thousands of dollars in Homeland Security grants for foreign police exchange programs. In this way, U.S. LEAs are trained by, and alongside, foreign military and police partners who themselves routinely engage in human rights abuses.

These exchange programs can take various forms. We focus here on exchanges with Israel, which account for 80 percent of the total. Since the first George W. Bush administration, organizations like the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) have administered police exchange programs for thousands of law enforcement officers (LEOs), both hosting U.S. officers in Israel and bringing Israeli instructors to the United States, for extremism and counterterrorism seminars.29 Over half of U.S. states participate in such exchanges with Israel, with New York and Georgia among the most prominent participants.30 The NYPD even operates a permanent branch in Israel.31

By arrangement with the United States, Israel has armed and trained repressive military forces the world over, prominently in Central America and Colombia, to neutralize resistance movements seeking to undermine U.S. hegemony over the region.32 Critics argue that the Israeli military industry can offer an assurance: 鈥渢hat its products [have already been] 鈥榝ield-proven鈥 on Palestinians鈥 by the time of purchase.33

Since the end of the Second Intifada in 2005, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have used the Urban Warfare Training Center in the Negev Desert, financed with $45 million provided by the United States, to train in counterinsurgency tactics.34 The facility, dubbed Mini Gaza by trainees, simulates Gazan urban infrastructure across 7.4 square miles of 鈥渘arrow streets and around 600 structures that include storefronts, schools, apartments and mosques.鈥35

Israel鈥檚 continuous 鈥渟tate of emergency鈥 (in effect since May 1948) permits it to forgo civil liberties by (among other things) detaining people, including journalists, for indefinite periods of time without informing them of the charge, blocking their access to courts, and preventing those detained from challenging their incarceration.36 Geographer Omar Jabary Salamanca, political scientist Mezna Qato, anthropologist Kareem Rabie, and economist Sobhi Samour describe Israeli police and military using these emergency powers to conduct 鈥渁erial and maritime bombardment, massacre and invasion, home demolitions, land theft, identity card confiscation, racist laws and loyalty tests, the wall, the siege on Gaza, cultural appropriation, [and] dependence on willing (or unwilling) native collaboration regarding security.鈥37

The Israeli military framework regards Palestinians within Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories as inherently suspect of terrorism to justify disproportionate searches and interrogations. Palestinian participation in political spaces serves to justify surveillance and detentions. Palestinian protests for self-颅determination are 鈥渃ategorically forbid[den],鈥 and the IDF often responds with lethal militarized force.38 LEOs returning to the United States after receiving instruction within this paradigm have adopted similar levels of suspicion, arguing that intrinsic racial characteristics can serve as markers of latent terroristic tendencies. Moreover, in addition to these tactics, LEAs across the country have deployed Israeli-manufactured weapons like Skunk gas alongside other military capabilities during various protests for Black lives in the United States throughout the past decade.39

Among the most well-known of the police exchange programs is the Georgia International Law Enforcement Exchange (GILEE), founded within the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University in 1992 by Robert Friedmann, professor emeritus of criminal justice.40 GILEE hosts partnerships with foreign states in the Americas, North Africa, and various regions of Asia, Europe, and Australia, but its first and by far most meaningful partner has historically been Israel.41 GILEE has trained over eleven hundred officials across two hundred ninety programs in partnership with the Atlanta Police Department (APD) and the Atlanta Police Foundation (APF), the biggest police foundation in the United States.42 The specific topics of study are undisclosed to the public, but advocates have discovered they involve at least twenty-eight disciplines such as 鈥渦rban policing, community policing, and border policing.鈥43 The number of fatal shootings by Georgia law enforcement has increased during the course of exchange programs with Israel.44

Much of the work of GILEE is characterized by anti-Muslim bias. In 2017, for example, Friedmann gave a presentation relying on a map depicting a world conquered by Islam, sourced from anti-Muslim websites.45 He baselessly asserted that the 鈥渟ilent majority鈥 of Muslims failed to disavow anti-West terrorism; he condemned the United Nations for scrutinizing the pretenses for the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq; he lamented that the First Amendment protects mosques from FBI targeting; and he denied the very existence and nature of Islamophobia by referring to it as 鈥渒nife-o-phobia.鈥46 GILEE perpetuates anti-Muslim sentiment through partnerships with organizations like the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, whose founder Boaz Ganor infamously stated that World War III has already commenced and is a 鈥渞eligious war . . . within the religion of Islam鈥 that, if not contained, will spill over throughout the world.47 This indoctrination permeates LEAs; former Georgia Bureau of Investigations (GBI) Director Vernon Keenan, for example, said he learned from a GILEE partner that 鈥渢he primary threat to democratic countries was terrorism by radical Islam.鈥48

Surveillance is another area in which collaboration with Israel has influenced U.S. policing. Israeli surveillance technology trickles down to U.S. LEAs. According to Friedmann, much of Atlanta鈥檚 surveillance system鈥攖he largest in the United States鈥攊s inspired by Israel鈥檚 own.49 The Atlanta surveillance network includes the Atlanta Police Foundation鈥檚 Operation Shield: a network of more than twenty thousand 鈥減ublic and private sector cameras鈥 that monitors 鈥淎tlanta鈥檚 neighborhoods, business centers, major public spaces, and thoroughfares鈥 and feeds video to the APD, which provides 鈥渞eal-time monitoring and dispatching of police to trouble spots.鈥50 The APD, largely through its 鈥淗omeland Security Unit,鈥 also monitors hundreds of social media posts of perceived political opponents including invitations to study groups on abortion rights, pizza nights about community safety, and information on the proposed Atlanta Public Safety Training Center, colloquially dubbed 鈥淐op City.鈥51 The NYPD utilized similar technology in its now inoperative Demographics Unit, designed after Israeli surveillance tactics in the West Bank, to profile, track, and infiltrate Muslim communities in New York and surrounding states.52 U.S. Customs and Border Protection has collaborated with Israeli contractors to set up technologies including 鈥渂limps outfitted with high-powered radar, underground sensors, and facial recognition software,鈥 as are used in Palestine.53 The entirety of the U.S. policing apparatus, from federal crime and immigration agencies to state and local LEAs, then aggregates the data in at least seventy-nine fusion centers to produce a national surveillance colossus.54

The surveillance data are used, among other things, in preemptive prosecutions that criminalize the lawful expressions of Black, migrant, and Muslim people.55 One report found that from the onset of the war on terror in 2001 through December 2015, 93 percent of the 608 鈥渢errorism鈥 convictions by the U.S. Department of Justice were either purely preemptive or involved elements of preemptive prosecutions.56

Two organizations, Researching the American-Israeli Alliance (RAIA) and Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), jointly produced a fuller review of the many ways in which these police exchanges undermine the civil and human rights of vulnerable communities, including undue racial profiling and use of force.57 At a minimum, argues JVP chapter coleader Connie Sosnoff, the exchange programs with Israel lend credibility to the atrocious practices of U.S. LEOs even independent of the ex颅changes.58 This scheme has inspired religious leaders, academics, and other advocates of Black and Muslim civil liberties to demand the abolition of GILEE.59

Cop City, the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center being built across eighty-five acres of the Weelaunee Forest, is set to become the largest police training facility nationwide. It also has links to the police exchanges.60 The center is to host 鈥渕ilitary-style training facilities, designated explosives testing areas, and shooting ranges鈥 plus 鈥渁 鈥榲ehicle skills pad,鈥 a 鈥榖urn building,鈥欌赌 and 鈥渁 mock city, complete with greenery and a replica of an Atlanta city block鈥 for training in 鈥渦rban warfare.鈥61 The proposal projects that 43 percent of trainees will come from outside Atlanta, presumably including Israeli forces through the GILEE and other exchange programs.62 GILEE already brings some Israeli LEOs to Georgia to train in various disciplines, prominently 鈥渃ommunity policing.鈥63 In the United States, almost all cities report holding community policing鈥攚hich the U.S. Department of Justice defines as 鈥渁 collaboration between the police and the community that identifies and solves community problems鈥濃攁s central to their governance, but positive outcomes have proven elusive to measure and police misconduct remains rampant across the country, often to lethal effects.64 Justin Hansford, law professor at Howard University and executive director of the Thurgood Marshall Civil Rights Center, argues that community policing further entrenches the colonial violence of the United States upon its marginalized Black communities.65

Cop City鈥檚 approximately $90 million funding has come from the City of Atlanta (near $30 million) and funds raised privately by the Atlanta Police Foundation. The APF receives significant funding from some of the same billionaires who finance the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). This includes Home Depot CEO Bernie Marcus, who likely contributed about 38 percent of GILEE鈥檚 funding between 2008 and 2013鈥攄onating $350,000 to GILEE since 2022 and $500,000 to the APF over the past decade鈥攁nd who in the 2024 election cycle was the fourth highest contributor to the AIPAC super PAC United Democracy Project.66 The board of the APF itself includes the CEO of Waffle House and the Atlanta Hawks as well as the vice presidents of Home Depot and Delta Air Lines.67 Another major APF donor is Cox Enterprises, an Atlanta media conglomerate and owner of The Atlanta Journal Constitution, the city鈥檚 top newspaper and source of various editorials supporting Cop City.68 Notably, corporate donations to police foundations circumvent the oversight that accompanies public funding of LEAs.69

Since the proposal for Cop City was announced, protesters have attempted to shut down the project with actions that have ranged from peaceful marches and canvassing to property damage. In response to their efforts, protestors have faced arrest, surveillance, and intimidation. The violent response included the killing of twenty-six-year-old forest defender Manuel Esteban 鈥淭ortuguita鈥 Paez Ter谩n by state troopers and local police in January 2023 about a mile away from the Cop City site.70 In 2023, the Georgia Attorney General indicted sixty-one people, from organizers to passersby to bail-fund liaisons, on racketeering charges.71 Forty-two were additionally charged with domestic terrorism.72 The expansion of the definition of terrorism to increase the penalties of those convicted is also discussed in Shirin Sinnar鈥檚 contribution to this volume, and is a practice that the Trump administration has embraced.73 In this instance, the bulk of those arrested were apprehended at the South River Music Festival, located nearly a mile away from the Stop Cop City protests and organized purely in support of the movement.74

Since February 2024, the APD has been waging a campaign of surveillance and intimidation of protesters.75 It started with raids on three homes of Stop Cop City organizers, searching for evidence of arson of police and construction machinery.76 LEOs have since 鈥渇ollow[ed] people in cars, blast[ed] sirens outside bedroom windows and sh[one] headlights into houses at night,鈥 targeting roughly a dozen homes across four neighborhoods.77 A resident of a raided home once awoke at 3 a.m. to find a flare igniting his porch鈥檚 wooden railing.78 Moreover, the Brennan Center has acquired thousands of pages in internal communications detailing the breadth of the APD鈥檚 surveillance of Stop Cop City activists.79 This neighborhood surveillance and harassment seem redundant when the city already possesses the most intrusive digital surveillance network in the country. It is likely intended to intimidate, as much as the law permits, the dissenters of Cop City.80 If that was the goal, it seems to have worked: city residents have since reported that they are avoiding related organizing out of fear of the police response.81

The Atlanta arrests of Cop City opponents and others are highly questionable. The arrest warrants mention no specific incident giving rise to the arrests, but rather center on circumstantial conduct, like having worn muddied clothes or having shared a hammock with someone who was also arrested.82 A number of the warrants falsely alleged that DHS had classified Stop Cop City as a 鈥渄omestic violent extremist鈥 group, a claim that DHS itself refuted as it only so classifies individuals (not groups) 鈥渨ho seek to further social or political goals, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence.鈥83 Georgia Bureau of Investigations鈥 public affairs director Nelly Miles nevertheless defended this fabrication by claiming that individual Stop Cop City protesters fall within DHS鈥檚 description and, therefore, it can be extended to the group as a whole.84 For its part, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis accused the protesters of being violent antipolice domestic extremists, a claim that the State of Georgia cited, alongside social media posts by the group inviting the public to join the protests, to frame the protesters as 鈥渁n organized criminal gang鈥 culpable of racketeering.85 None of those charged with domestic terrorism were accused of injuring anyone: some were accused of arson and vandalism; others of activities including canvassing, distributing flyers, and setting up town halls; and nine were accused of misdemeanor trespass.86

The domestic terrorism charges rely on a 2017 state law reportedly drafted in response to the 2015 white-supremacist massacre that took the lives of nine people at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina.87 The law amended the state definition of terrorism to include damage to property.88 The law has now been used to prosecute Stop Cop City protesters for their political activities and festivalgoers caught in the government鈥檚 crosshairs. Those accused of damaging construction equipment face a mandatory minimum sentence of five to thirty-five years behind bars.89

Justifying the charges, APD Assistant Police Chief Carven Tyrus mischaracterized the indictees as outside agitators 鈥渇rom Los Angeles, California.鈥90 This rationale perpetuates a historical pattern of characterizing local resistance as imported. Segregationists infamously accused Dr. Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., of being an outside agitator bringing an insurrectionary mindset to a Black Southern population otherwise content with their oppression, and public officials are now pushing this line against students in Georgia protesting their colleges鈥 complicity with the Israeli genocide of Palestinian people.91 Meanwhile, the LEAs that are silencing local grievances have themselves adopted suppressive tactics developed and perfected by outside local, state, federal, and foreign agencies through exchange programs like GILEE.

Police have similarly designated protesters for Palestinian liberation as threats to national security鈥攁 practice that has now become common during the Trump administration. Georgia State University students experienced it firsthand in 2011 when they filed Open Records Requests to access public records on GILEE.92 Robert Friedmann, the organization鈥檚 founder, accused the students of having 鈥渢ies to known terrorists鈥 and insisted the information must remain secret to prevent 鈥渕ak[ing GILEE] a target鈥 because 鈥渢he working assumption should be that people are conspiring to cause harm.鈥93 Georgia attorney general Sam Olens suggested the students were operating not of their own accord but under outsider influences, and that complying with the request might 鈥渁id terrorists.鈥94 Georgia state legislators then enacted House Bill 261, restricting the disclosures of records that may 鈥渃ompromise security against sabotage or criminal or terrorist acts.鈥95

Labels have legal consequences. Environmentalists, Black liberation advocates, and antifascists have sometimes been branded 鈥渆xtremists鈥 and 鈥渢errorists.鈥96 Anthropologist Darryl Li argues that 鈥渆arly U.S. antiterrorism legislation evolved specifically to oppose Palestinian liberation struggles.鈥97 The U.S. Congress responded by codifying an antiterrorism framework to diminish their voices.98 This series of congressional initiatives is suggestive:

  • The 1969 Foreign Assistance Act referenced 鈥渢errorism鈥 in the federal code for the first time to curtail funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

  • The 1979 Export Administration Act vested authority in the U.S. Secretary of State to classify foreign states as State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism, which disproportionately involved countries in Southwest Asia and North Africa deemed sympathetic to Palestine.

  • After the largely nonviolent First Intifada, a series of protests involving civil disobedience in Palestine, Congress enacted the 1987 Antiterrorism Act, producing the federal Foreign Terrorist Organizations list and denoting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the internationally recognized political representative of Palestine, as a terrorist organization鈥攖he only time Congress had so targeted a named group.

  • The 1990 Immigration and Nationality Act was amended to add 鈥渢errorism鈥 to the grounds for deportation, particularly of PLO members.

  • The 1992 Antiterrorism Act, enacted in reaction to the Palestine Liberation Front鈥檚 execution of Jewish American Leon Klinghoffer during the hijacking of the MS Achille Lauro cruise ship, introduced civil liability for acts of international terrorism.

  • And, following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing by white antigovernment domestic terrorists, organizations including the ADL lobbied Congress to enact the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act to criminalize 鈥渕aterial support鈥 of international terrorist organizations鈥攂y now the most common charge in terrorism prosecutions.99

In October 2023, the Biden administration compared pro-Palestine protesters to the white supremacist Unite the Right rallygoers who in 2017 chanted 鈥淛ews will not replace us鈥 in the streets of Charlottesville, Virginia.100 It further called on federal agencies to monitor protesters as 鈥渄omestic threats,鈥 fostering a rise in FBI presence at U.S. mosques and increased DHS abuses of Palestinian migrants.101 In November 2023, U.S. Congressman Ryan Zinke introduced the 鈥淪afeguarding Americans From Extremism Act鈥 to 鈥渆xpel Palestinians from the United States.鈥 The bill included provisions to strip Palestinians in the United States of their visas, refugee status, asylum, and temporary protected status granted on or after October 2023 and to prohibit Palestinians abroad from entering the United States.102 Among the most notorious proposals was H.R. 6090, titled the 鈥淎ntisemitism Awareness Act,鈥 which sought to render criticisms of Israel indistinguishable from legally actionable antisemitism.103 The 2024 Republican platform listed, among its twenty policy promises, to 鈥渄eport pro-Hamas Radicals and Make Our College Campuses Safe and Patriotic Again,鈥 seemingly referring to the students participating in Palestine solidarity encampments nationwide.104 Much of this agenda is now being carried out by the Trump administration.

Police crackdowns were on full display in 2024 as law enforcement agencies assaulted peaceful Gaza solidarity encampments nationwide, subjecting thousands of protesters鈥攕tudents, professors, and staff鈥攖o physical, chemical, and legal attacks.105 The disproportionate use of force against protestors at Columbia University was replicated on campuses across the country.106 At Indiana University, police snipers were stationed on university rooftops.107 In contrast, acts of force by counterprotesters saw significantly less retaliation; in one instance, nonstudent Zionists assaulted pro-Palestine student protesters with 鈥減epper spray, wooden planks, and fireworks鈥 at the University of California, Los Angeles, while LEOs stood by for hours. Thousands of students were arrested by midsummer, and some universities revised their policies to limit protest areas, prohibit tents, and otherwise penalize students and student organizations decrying the genocide.108

At the state level, antiprotest legislation and enforcement have been underway for years. Between 2017 and August 2024, forty-five states cumulatively considered over three hundred antiprotest bills, with twenty-four states collectively enacting fifty-six, imposing new or augmented charges against protestors for disorderly assembly, public nuisance, demonstrating in front of residential property, and even wearing a facemask in public.109 Conspicuously, some states are reviving age-old anti-mask statutes against protesters wearing masks, regardless of reason, whether as COVID-19 precautions or protection from mass government surveillance or simply as part of their religious expression.110 Inescapably, the growing criminalization of protest activities heightens the likelihood that protesters will face further victimization by militarized LEOs.

Victims of unconstitutional police abuse often have no redress. Nominally, they may invoke Section 1983 of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1871, but over half a century of qualified immunity jurisprudence has effectively elevated police misconduct above judicial reproach.111 Since the 2020 uprisings, several states considered bills to restrict qualified immunity, but police lobbying defeated or critically altered nearly all of them by arguing that the threat of financial ruin would paralyze officers into inaction and thrust society into anarchy.112 Of the bills that were enacted, the overwhelming majority avoided abridging qualified immunity and some even reinforced it, such as the New Mexico version that dropped the mechanism for suing individual officers and instead shifted the financial burden of civil lawsuits from the police to local budgets and, by extension, taxpayers.113

On June 9, 2020, as the Black Lives Matter protests following the killing of George Floyd ramped up, ADL senior vice president George Selim and vice president for law enforcement and analysis Greg Ehrie questioned, in a draft memo, whether the ADL should continue its support of trips by U.S. law enforcement to meet Israel National Police. Selim and Ehrie wrote,

in light of the very real police brutality at the hands of militarized police forces in the U.S., we must ask ourselves difficult questions, like whether we are contributing to the problem. That is, we must ask ourselves why it is necessary for American police, enforcing American laws, [to] meet with members of the Israeli military. We must ask ourselves if, upon returning home, those we train are more likely to use force.114

The ADL has since disavowed this memo, though its police exchange program was later paused reportedly for COVID-19 concerns.115 Still, the legacy of the exchanges continued. On the night of June 12, 2020, for example, Atlanta local police murdered Rayshard Brooks. Protestors of Brooks鈥檚 killing were met with kettling, flashbangs, and tear gas by police in riot gear, all known tactics of escalation previously used by Israeli forces in the West Bank.116

The proposal for Atlanta鈥檚 Cop City and the harsh reaction against those protesting it are alarming, and even more so is the push since for dozens of such facilities from coast to coast. As of July 31, 2024, over eighty such centers have been proposed or begun construction in every state in the country except Wyoming, with dimensions of up to eight hundred acres.117 The temporal proximity to the 2020 uprisings indicates an intention to supply militarized LEOs anywhere at any time to crack down on civilian discontent. Journalist Radley Balko has explained that 鈥渁 disproportionate amount鈥 of police training is already 鈥渁bout use of force, and there鈥檚 too little emphasis on de-escalation and negotiation.鈥118 The American Bar Association has noted that de-escalation as a component of police training has inevitably 鈥渆bbed鈥 as militarization grows.119

As this militarization of the government鈥檚 legal monopoly on violence continues to escalate, grassroots organizers mobilizing against a colonial status quo must ready themselves to respond to it. Campaigns including JVP鈥檚 Deadly Exchange have existed since 2017 to end law enforcement exchange programs with Israel, and they have succeeded in pressuring localities like Durham, North Carolina, to ban such participation by LEAs within their jurisdictions.120 Diligent examination of such successes will doubtlessly prove invaluable to advocates fighting to keep themselves and their communities safe from the persistent threat of state repression.

Endnotes

  • 1Aim茅 C茅saire, , trans. Joan Pinkham (Monthly Review Press, 2000), 36, 41.
  • 2See Julian Go, 鈥,鈥 American Journal of Sociology 125 (5) (2020): 1237鈥1241.
  • 3Derek S. Denman, 鈥,鈥 Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 38 (6) (2020): 4鈥7. For a brief overview of the history of U.S. policing as an enforcer of white supremacy and an exploration of the repressive mentality ingrained in the militarization of U.S. policing, see Wayne McElrath and Sarah Turberville, 鈥,鈥 Project on Government Oversight, June 9, 2020.
  • 4Jonathan Mummolo, 鈥,鈥 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115 (37) (2018): 9185鈥9186 (additionally finding that police militarization fails to actually lower rates of violent crime and violence against the police).
  • 5A. Naomi Paik, 鈥,鈥 Modern American History 6 (2023): 65鈥66.
  • 6, May 13, 2021.
  • 7This essay uses Vladimir Lenin鈥檚 postulation of imperialism as 鈥渢he highest stage of capi颅talism.鈥 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 鈥,鈥 in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, trans. Tim Delaney and Kevin Goins (Progress Publishers, 1963).
  • 8Matthew Petti, 鈥溾 Reason, June 20, 2022; Christopher Luke, 鈥,鈥 Mainline, September 2, 2020; and Defense Logistics Agency, 鈥,鈥 (accessed November 12, 2025).
  • 9Charlotte Lawrence and Cyrus J. O鈥橞rien, 鈥,鈥 American Civil Liberties Union, May 12, 2021.
  • 10Ibid.
  • 11Luke, 鈥淔rom Atlanta to Palestine鈥; and Lawrence and O鈥橞rien, 鈥淔ederal Militarization of Law Enforcement Must End.鈥
  • 12Paul Blest, 鈥,鈥 Vice, March 10, 2022.
  • 13Ibid.
  • 14See generally Kara Dansky, 鈥,鈥 American Civil Liberties Union, June 2014.
  • 15Ryan Welch and Martin Stavro, 鈥淒oes Police Militarization Increase Repression,鈥 Journal of Conflict Resolution 68 (5) (2024): 991.
  • 16Jim Dalrymple II, 鈥,鈥 BuzzFeed News, August 14, 2014; Charlotte Lawrence, Cyrus J. O鈥橞rien, and Maritza Perez, 鈥,鈥 American Civil Liberties Union, May 12, 2021; and 鈥,鈥 History, last modified January 24, 2025.
  • 17Thomas Gibbons-Neff, 鈥,鈥 The Washington Post, August 14, 2014.
  • 18Kanya Bennett, 鈥,鈥 American Civil Liberties Union, August 7, 2015.
  • 19See Law Enforcement Equipment Working Group, (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2015).
  • 20Through Executive Order 13809, Restoring State, Tribal, and Local Law Enforcement鈥檚 Access to Life-Saving Equipment and Resources, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,499 (August 28, 2017).
  • 21Lawrence and O鈥橞rien, 鈥淔ederal Militarization of Law Enforcement Must End.鈥
  • 22Advancing Effective, Accountable Policing and Criminal Justice Practices to Enhance Public Trust and Public Safety, 87 Fed. Reg. 32,945 (May 25, 2022).
  • 23Barry Friedman, Jessica W. Gillooly, Maria Ponomarenko, et al., (New York University School of Law Policing Project and Emory University Politics of Policing Lab and National Police Foundation, 2021), 29, 34.
  • 24Ibid., 34.
  • 25Respondent agencies commented pursuant to this report that if 鈥渢here鈥檚 something we need, yeah, we鈥檙e getting it, we鈥檒l find a way,鈥 assuring that 鈥渙ur departments are also pretty good at getting stuff that we need鈥 even if they 鈥渨ould just have to be more creative . . . or something else would have to give.鈥 Ibid., 33.
  • 26Ibid., 34.
  • 27SeeLesley Gill, The School of the Americas:Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas (Duke University Press, 2004).
  • 28Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., , GAO-12-534 (U.S. Government Account颅ability Office, 2012), 25.
  • 29Ibid. See also Petti, 鈥淒o Small Town Cops Need Training in Israeli Counterterror Techniques?鈥; and Luke, 鈥淔rom Atlanta to Palestine.鈥 In 2015, ADL director of national law enforcement initiatives David C. Friedman celebrated how U.S. police participating in the program 鈥渃ome back and they are Zionists.鈥 Also, a Southern California sheriff who participated in the program remarked that it 鈥渂roadened [his] perspective鈥 to learn from Israeli security how its surveillance system 鈥渁llowed them to . . . track known dissidents or known criminals.鈥 See Alex Kane and Sam Levin, 鈥,鈥 Jewish Currents, March 17, 2022.
  • 30Petti, 鈥淒o Small Town Cops Need Training in Israeli Counterterror Techniques?鈥; Lawrence and O鈥橞rien, 鈥淔ederal Militarization of Law Enforcement Must End鈥; and Luke, 鈥淔rom Atlanta to Palestine.鈥
  • 31Petti, 鈥淒o Small Town Cops Need Training in Israeli Counterterror Techniques?鈥
  • 32Matene Toure, 鈥,鈥欌赌 Prism, April 8, 2024; and Micah Herskind, 鈥,鈥 Scalawag, May 1, 2023.
  • 33Toure, 鈥淚srael鈥檚 Apartheid Tech 鈥業s Booming.鈥欌
  • 34Derek Seidman, 鈥,鈥 Truthout, July 31, 2024.
  • 35Ibid.; and Herskind, 鈥淭his Is the Atlanta Way.鈥
  • 36Petti, 鈥淒o Small Town Cops Need Training in Israeli Counterterror Techniques?鈥 See also John Quigley, 鈥溾 Michigan Journal of International Law 15 (2) (1994): 492. In late 2024, the Knesset, the legislative body of Israel, renewed the state of emergency yet again through December 16, 2025. 鈥,鈥 The Times of Israel, December 24, 2024. For an analysis on how the 鈥渆mergency鈥 order in Israel is critical to and furthers the Israeli settler colonial model, see John Reynolds, 鈥,鈥 The Nakba Files, March 26, 2017.
  • 37Omar Jabary Salamanca, Mezna Qato, Kareem Rabie, and Sobhi Samour, 鈥,鈥 Settler Colonial Studies 2 (1) (2012): 2.
  • 38See Researching the American-Israeli Alliance and Jewish Voice for Peace, (Researching the American-Israeli Alliance and Jewish Voice for Peace, 2018).
  • 39Ibid., 22鈥24, 27鈥29.
  • 40Petti, 鈥淒o Small Town Cops Need Training in Israeli Counterterror Techniques?鈥; and Luke, 鈥淔rom Atlanta to Palestine.鈥
  • 41Luke, 鈥淔rom Atlanta to Palestine.鈥
  • 42Petti, 鈥淒o Small Town Cops Need Training in Israeli Counterterror Techniques?鈥
  • 43CAIR-Georgia, 鈥,鈥 Council on American-Islamic Relations, August 18, 2020, 1.
  • 44See also Ilise Benshushan Cohen and Azadeh Shahshahani, 鈥,鈥 The Progressive, October 7, 2019.
  • 45CAIR-Georgia, 鈥淏igotry & Brutality in Foreign Police Training,鈥 8.
  • 46Luke, 鈥淔rom Atlanta to Palestine鈥; and CAIR-Georgia, 鈥淏igotry & Brutality in Foreign Police Training,鈥 7. Friedmann supplemented this declaration with an out-of-context videoclip displaying Palestinian people stabbing Israeli police officers. See Anna Simonton, 鈥,鈥 Mondoweiss, January 5, 2016.
  • 47Luke, 鈥淔rom Atlanta to Palestine鈥; and CAIR-Georgia, 鈥淏igotry & Brutality in Foreign Police Training,鈥 9.
  • 48CAIR-Georgia, 鈥淏igotry & Brutality in Foreign Police Training,鈥 7.
  • 49Seidman, 鈥淎tlanta鈥檚 Cop City Is Funded by Some of the Same Billionaires Who Back AIPAC.鈥
  • 50

    Herskind, 鈥淭his Is the Atlanta Way鈥; and Atlanta Police Foundation, 鈥溾 (accessed July 30, 2025).

  • 51Spencer Reynolds and Jos茅 G. Guti茅rrez, 鈥,鈥 Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law, July 30, 2024.
  • 52Petti, 鈥淒o Small Town Cops Need Training in Israeli Counterterror Techniques?鈥; and Luke, 鈥淔rom Atlanta to Palestine.鈥
  • 53Toure, 鈥淚srael鈥檚 Apartheid Tech 鈥業s Booming.鈥欌
  • 54Fusion centers allow municipal and state LEAs to share surveillance footage with federal agencies. See also Reynolds and Guti茅rrez, 鈥淚nternal Atlanta Police Records Reveal Monitoring of 鈥楥op City鈥 Opponents鈥 Political Activity.鈥
  • 55

    Azadeh Shahshahani and Juilee Shivalkar, 鈥,鈥 Middle East Eye, November 3, 2023.

  • 56Additionally, Project SALAM and the Coalition for Civil Freedoms released a report in 2019, cosponsored by ICNA Council for Social Justice, updating their 2014 findings on the rate of preemptive prosecutions in the United States since September 11, 2001. SeeStephen Downs and Kathy Manley, 鈥,鈥 Project SALAM and Coalition for Civil Freedoms, April 2019. The report generally defines the 425 instances of purely preemptive prosecutions as those 鈥渃haracterized by the absence of a crime involving injury to people, damage to property, or disruption of public order鈥 and based purely upon speculation that the defendant might one day partake in terrorist activities based exclusively on their faith or worldview, as in the case of defendant Tarek Mehanna, who, in his studies of Islam, translated several pieces by Afghan and Iraqi scholars online, which prosecutors baselessly argued could support terrorist activities by al-Qaeda. Ibid., 9鈥10, 15, 19. In contrast, the report defines the 141 cases involving elements of preemptive prosecutions as those wherein a nonterror crime was committed and the state attempted to link it to terrorism, as in the case of a defendant smuggling cigarettes and a prosecution asserting that the sales were intended to fund terrorist activities. Ibid., 11.
  • 57See Researching the American-Israeli Alliance and Jewish Voice for Peace, Deadly Exchange.
  • 58Petti, 鈥淒o Small Town Cops Need Training in Israeli Counterterror Techniques?鈥
  • 59Luke, 鈥淔rom Atlanta to Palestine.鈥
  • 60The land, owned by the City of Atlanta, was originally stolen from the Muscogee Creek nation in the 1820s and 1830s and repurposed by the settler city government as a prison farm and police academy between the 1920s and the 1990s. Charles Bethea, 鈥,鈥 The New Yorker, August 3, 2022. For a brief history of the forcible displacement of the Muscogee Creek nation by the settler state and federal governments, see National Park Service, 鈥,鈥 U.S. Department of Interior (accessed April 11, 2025).
  • 61Bethea, 鈥淭he New Fight Over an Old Forest in Atlanta鈥; and Jane Houseal, 鈥,鈥 Teen Vogue, May 22, 2024.
  • 62Carlos E. Berr铆os Polanco, 鈥,鈥 Latino Rebels, August 7, 2023.
  • 63Luke, 鈥淔rom Atlanta to Palestine.鈥
  • 64Bureau of Justice Assistance, (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994), vii. See Carol A. Archbold, 鈥淧olice Accountability in the USA: Gaining Traction or Spinning Wheels?鈥 Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice 15 (3) (2021): 1669; 鈥減olice culture involves officers鈥 attitudes associated with cynicism and mistrust of citizens and supervisors, authoritarianism, loyalty to fellow officers, resistance to change, aggressive enforcement of the law, and secrecy.鈥 See also 鈥,鈥 The Washington Post, last updated December 31, 2024; 鈥,鈥 Statista, (accessed April 11, 2025); and Melissa Morgan, 鈥溾 Stanford University Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, November 30, 2021 (additionally reviewing community policing practices abroad and finding this model to be ineffective where police have few incentives to correct their misconduct).
  • 65Justin Hansford, 鈥,鈥 in Policing the Planet: Why the Policing Crisis Led to Black Lives Matter, ed. Jordan T. Camp and Christina Heatherton (Verso Books, 2016), 181鈥183. As Professor Hansford explains, the harmony the community policing model promises is unfeasible while the police as an institution operate within a 鈥渂roken windows鈥 political economy, designed and sustained for the disenfranchisement and marginalization of Black communities to the benefit of the white colonial hegemony.
  • 66Seidman, 鈥淎tlanta鈥檚 Cop City Is Funded by Some of the Same Billionaires Who Back AIPAC.鈥
  • 67Bethea, 鈥淭he New Fight Over an Old Forest in Atlanta.鈥
  • 68Ibid.
  • 69Seidman, 鈥淎tlanta鈥檚 Cop City Is Funded by Some of the Same Billionaires Who Back AIPAC.鈥
  • 70Reynolds and Guti茅rrez, 鈥淚nternal Atlanta Police Records Reveal Monitoring of 鈥楥op City鈥 Opponents鈥 Political Activity鈥; Houseal, 鈥淎tlanta鈥檚 Cop City鈥; Berr铆os Polanco, 鈥淔or Latino Activists, 鈥楥op City鈥 a New Phase of U.S. Imperialism鈥; and Timothy Pratt, 鈥,鈥 The Guardian, May 13, 2024.
  • 71Reynolds and Guti茅rrez, 鈥淚nternal Atlanta Police Records Reveal Monitoring of 鈥楥op City鈥 Opponents鈥 Political Activity鈥; and Berr铆os Polanco, 鈥淔or Latino Activists, 鈥楥op City鈥 a New Phase of U.S. Imperialism.鈥
  • 72Reynolds and Guti茅rrez, 鈥淚nternal Atlanta Police Records Reveal Monitoring of 鈥楥op City鈥 Opponents鈥 Political Activity鈥; Berr铆os Polanco, 鈥淔or Latino Activists, 鈥楥op City鈥 a New Phase of U.S. Imperialism鈥; and Kody Cava, 鈥,鈥 Current Affairs, May 6, 2024.
  • 73Shirin Sinnar, 鈥The Supreme Court & the Unaccountable Racialized Security State,鈥 顿忙dalus 154 (4) (Fall 2025): 106鈥121.
  • 74Berr铆os Polanco, 鈥淔or Latino Activists, 鈥楥op City鈥 a New Phase of U.S. Imperialism鈥; and Cava, 鈥淭he Meaning of 鈥楾errorism,鈥 According to the United States.鈥
  • 75Timothy Pratt, 鈥溾 The Guardian, May 29, 2024.
  • 76Ibid.
  • 77Ibid.
  • 78Ibid.
  • 79Reynolds and Guti茅rrez, 鈥淚nternal Atlanta Police Records Reveal Monitoring of 鈥楥op City鈥 Opponents鈥 Political Activity.鈥
  • 80Pratt, 鈥淎tlanta Police Surveil People Opposing 鈥楥op City.鈥欌
  • 81Reynolds and Guti茅rrez, 鈥淚nternal Atlanta Police Records Reveal Monitoring of 鈥楥op City鈥 Opponents鈥 Political Activity.鈥
  • 82Berr铆os Polanco, 鈥淔or Latino Activists, 鈥楥op City鈥 a New Phase of U.S. Imperialism鈥; and Defending Rights and Defense, 18 Million Rising, 2L, et al., 鈥,鈥 Human Rights Watch, March 3, 2023.
  • 83Berr铆os Polanco, 鈥淔or Latino Activists, 鈥楥op City鈥 a New Phase of U.S. Imperialism鈥; and Defending Rights and Defense, 18 Million Rising, 2L, et al., 鈥淟etter Calling for Dropping of Domestic Terrorism Charges Against Defend the Atlanta Forest Activists.鈥
  • 84Berr铆os Polanco, 鈥淔or Latino Activists, 鈥楥op City鈥 a New Phase of U.S. Imperialism.鈥
  • 85Reynolds and Guti茅rrez, 鈥淚nternal Atlanta Police Records Reveal Monitoring of 鈥楥op City鈥 Opponents鈥 Political Activity.鈥
  • 86Ibid.; Berr铆os Polanco, 鈥淔or Latino Activists, 鈥楥op City鈥 a New Phase of U.S. Imperialism鈥; and Defending Rights and Defense, 18 Million Rising, 2L, et al., 鈥淟etter Calling for Dropping of Domestic Terrorism Charges Against Defend the Atlanta Forest Activists.鈥
  • 87Defending Rights and Defense, 18 Million Rising, 2L, et al., 鈥淟etter Calling for Dropping of Domestic Terrorism Charges Against Defend the Atlanta Forest Activists鈥; and John J. Crowley and Tatiana E. Posada, 鈥,鈥 Georgia State University Law Review 34 (1) (2017): 30鈥31.
  • 88Berr铆os Polanco, 鈥淔or Latino Activists, 鈥楥op City鈥 a New Phase of U.S. Imperialism.鈥
  • 89Defending Rights and Defense, 18 Million Rising, 2L, et al., 鈥淟etter Calling for Dropping of Domestic Terrorism Charges Against Defend the Atlanta Forest Activists.鈥
  • 90Ibid.
  • 91The narrative of the 鈥渙utside agitator鈥 has in fact been quite pervasive throughout the history of liberation movements in the United States. Harmeet Kaur, 鈥,鈥 CNN, April 29, 2024; and Harmeet Kaur, 鈥,鈥 CNN, June 4, 2020.
  • 92Petti, 鈥淒o Small Town Cops Need Training in Israeli Counterterror Techniques?鈥
  • 93Ibid.
  • 94Ibid.
  • 95Ibid.; and Luke, 鈥淔rom Atlanta to Palestine.鈥
  • 96Cava, 鈥淭he Meaning of 鈥楾errorism,鈥 According to the United States.鈥
  • 97Darryl Li, (Palestine Legal and Center for Constitutional Rights, 2024).
  • 98Ibid.See also Alice Speri, 鈥,鈥 The Intercept, February 21, 2024.
  • 99Cava, 鈥淭he Meaning of 鈥楾errorism,鈥 According to the United States鈥; 鈥,鈥 Federal Bureau of Investigation (accessed May 5, 2025); and Trevor Aaronson and Margot Williams, 鈥淭rial and Terror,鈥 The Intercept, https://trial-and-terror.theintercept.com (access颅ed June 14, 2023).
  • 100

    Shahshahani and Shivalkar, 鈥淚srael-Palestine War: The 鈥榃ar on Terror鈥 Continues to Target Pro-Palestine Activists.鈥

  • 101Ibid.
  • 102Adrienne Mahsa Varkiani, 鈥,鈥 The New Republic, November 3, 2023.
  • 103Antisemitism Awareness Act of 2023, H.R. 6090, 118th Congress, October 26, 2023.
  • 104

    Republican National Committee, 2024; and Speri, 鈥淗ow the ADL鈥檚 Anti-Palestinian Advocacy Helped Shape U.S. Terror Laws.鈥

  • 105Brianna Suslovic, Cameron Rasmussen, Mimi E. Kim, et al., 鈥,鈥 Abolitionist Perspectives in Social Work 2 (1) (2024): 1鈥14; and Mohamed Buheji and Aamir Hasan, 鈥,鈥 International Journal of Management 15 (3) (2024): 56鈥86.
  • 106Suslovic, Rasmussen, Kim, et al., 鈥淪peaking Against Silence鈥; and Buheji and Hasan, 鈥淓choes of Wake-Up.鈥
  • 107Abdallah Fayyad, 鈥,鈥 Vox, May 3, 2024.
  • 108Buheji and Hasan, 鈥淓choes of Wake-Up鈥; Suslovic, Rasmussen, Kim, et al., 鈥淪peaking Against Silence鈥; and Fayyad, 鈥淭he Lessons from Colleges that Didn鈥檛 Call the Police.鈥
  • 109鈥,鈥 International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, last updated August 22, 2024.
  • 110Jay Stanley, 鈥,鈥 American Civil Liberties Union, May 15, 2024.
  • 111Whitney K. Novak, (Congressional Research Service, 2023).
  • 112Kimberly Kindy, 鈥,鈥 The Washington Post, October 7, 2021.
  • 113Ibid.
  • 114Kane and Levin, 鈥淚nternal ADL Memo Recommended Ending Police Delegations to Israel Amid Backlash鈥; and Memo to Jonathan Greenblat from George Selim and Greg Ehrie, 鈥,鈥 Anti-Defamation League, June 9, 2020.
  • 115Kane and Levin, 鈥淚nternal ADL Memo Recommended Ending Police Delegations to Israel Amid Backlash.鈥
  • 116Christopher Luke, 鈥,鈥 Mainline, July 11, 2020.
  • 117鈥,鈥 Is Your Life Better, (accessed July 31, 2024).
  • 118Houseal, 鈥淎tlanta鈥檚 Cop City.鈥
  • 119Jeffrey Gordon Adachi, 鈥,鈥 American Bar Association, January 1, 2017.
  • 120Petti, 鈥淒o Small Town Cops Need Training in Israeli Counterterror Techniques?鈥; and CAIR-Georgia, 鈥淏igotry & Brutality in Foreign Police Training,鈥 2.