亚色影库app

An open access publication of the 亚色影库app & Sciences
Winter/Spring 2026

Making Automation Work for Social Scientists

Author
M. J. Crockett
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M. J. Crockett is Director of the Future Values Initiative at the Princeton University Center for Human Values and Professor in the Department of Psychology at Princeton, where they also direct the Crockett Lab. They have published in such journals as Science, Nature, and Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

Many scientists of all stripes are optimistic about new research opportunities afforded by 鈥淎I.鈥 This term refers to a diverse set of automated and semiautomated technologies including (but not limited to) predictive machine learning systems, automated transcription, generative models that produce images and text, and chatbots built on large language models (LLMs) that simulate conversation. Within social science, researchers envision using these technologies to accelerate and expand their abilities to gather, analyze, and simulate human data.1 Some have even proposed automating the entire research pipeline, with LLMs replacing human subjects and scientists.2 

I鈥檝e watched these developments with a mixture of excitement and alarm. My lab at Princeton University has used predictive machine learning to analyze public discourse on social media, and recent advances in LLMs enable us to pursue research questions that were out of reach just a few years ago.3 At the same time, I worry that widespread adoption of automation across the research pipeline is outpacing thoughtful consideration of its many risks and harms, including harms to us as knowledge workers.4 To be clear: my worries don鈥檛 reflect a nostalgia for some idyllic analog past. Rather, I鈥檓 concerned with what scientific futures we foreclose if we cede our epistemic agency to automated systems.

I鈥檝e begun to find a way through this minefield in conversation with my brilliant and generous collaborator Lisa Messeri, an anthropologist of science and technology who investigates how expert communities create new fields of inquiry and innovation.5 Lisa introduced me to scholarship illuminating how political, economic, and cultural forces shape our collective imagination about what technology is and can be. Here, I offer some insights that have emerged from our collaboration and shape the way I approach research in my lab, with the aim of preserving our epistemic agency under intense pressure to give it away.6

First, industry marketing can mislead us into thinking that new technologies are more capable than they actually are. Technology companies are selling AI with overhyped claims of superhuman or even magical abilities.7 Some scientists imagine LLMs as oracles, capable of extracting 鈥渙bjective鈥 truths from the published literature or large datasets.8 Lisa and I name this imaginary as an illusion of objectivity: LLMs reflect the viewpoints of their engineers and those represented in their training data.9 Rather than removing bias from the scientific process, this technology entrenches dominant viewpoints while simultaneously obscuring them from view.10 Just as social scientists have begun to make progress in diversifying the questions we ask and the people we study, wholesale adoption of automation threatens to reverse that progress.

When automated tools are controlled by private industry, scientists cannot access information crucial for vetting the capabilities of these tools. Accounting for biases in models is challenging because of their opacity. This is especially the case for proprietary LLMs like the GPT product line, because OpenAI has not disclosed the contents of its models鈥 training data. Moreover, the outputs of proprietary LLMs vary unpredictably over time, as engineers tweak model parameters behind the scenes to satisfy corporate goals.11 We cannot build a robust and reproducible social science using models whose construction is opaque, whose outputs are unstable, and whose control rests in the hands of CEOs with very different goals than ours.12

Social scientists are increasingly seeking financial support from the technology industry, especially as public funding becomes scarce. This has at least two consequences for our science. First, we are incentivized to make our research questions fit the capabilities of automated tools. But not all questions are amenable to computational analysis.13 We suffer from an illusion of exploratory breadth when we mistake the subset of questions automated tools can address with the broader set of questions we can ask about the social world.14 Second, industry funding encourages scientists to focus on questions that are friendly to technology companies.15 These complementary forces can lead to the development of scientific monocultures, where a narrow set of methods and questions dominates knowledge production, making science less innovative and robust.16

The varied risks of automation for social science all flow from the outsourcing of scientific judgment to automated systems and the companies that control them. Recognizing this suggests concrete steps we can take to reclaim our epistemic agency in the short term and preserve it in the long term. Instead of being seduced by fantasies of 鈥渟uperintelligent鈥 general purpose systems that can replace the work of scientists, we can build automated tools for specific scientific tasks. Rather than relying on opaque proprietary models, we can insist on using open-source models with transparent documentation.17 To prevent the formation of scientific monocultures, we can recognize that qualitative and ethnographic work offers distinctive ways of understanding those aspects of social life that resist quantification, and we can advocate for continued investment in these diverse methodologies.18 We should also require our colleagues to be more transparent about conflicts of interest that arise from industry funding, encouraging industry-independent research instead.19

These things called 鈥淎I鈥 will surely change in the years to come, but this does not mean current insights have an expiration date. Our colleagues in the humanities and humanistic social sciences have long recognized that technological advances rarely create entirely new dilemmas, instead reproducing old dilemmas in new forms. The communal values of science have always been in tension with private commercial interests.20 Now, by aiming to commodify knowledge production itself, the technology industry makes this tension harder to ignore. Our urgent task at present is to question the uncritical embrace of artificial intelligence and articulate a future social science in which automation works for us.
 



Author鈥檚 Note

Thanks to Emily Bender, Lisa Messeri, and Alondra Nelson for helpful comments.

Endnotes

  • 1

    Igor Grossmann, Matthew Feinberg, Dawn C. Parker, et al., 鈥淎I and the Transformation of Social Science Research,鈥 Science 380 (6650) (2023): 1108鈥1109; and Christopher A. Bail, 鈥淐an Generative AI Improve Social Science?鈥 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 121 (21) (2024): e2314021121.

  • 2

    Benjamin S. Manning, Kehang Zhu, and John J. Horton, 鈥淎utomated Social Science: Language Models as Scientist and Subjects,鈥 NBER Working Paper 32381 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2024); and Sebastian Musslick, Younes Strittmatter, and Marina Dubova, 鈥,鈥 PsyArXiv (2024).

  • 3

    William J. Brady, Killian McLoughlin, Tuan N. Doan, and Molly J. Crockett, 鈥淗ow Social Learning Amplifies Moral Outrage Expression in Online Social Networks,鈥 Science Advances 7 (33) (2021): eabe5641; Killian L. McLoughlin, William J. Brady, Aden Goolsbee, et al., 鈥淢isinformation Exploits Outrage to Spread Online,鈥 Science 386 (6725) (2024): 991鈥996; and William J. Brady, Killian L. McLoughlin, Mark P. Torres, et al., 鈥淥verperception of Moral Outrage in Online Social Networks Inflates Beliefs About Intergroup Hostility,鈥 Nature Human Behavior 7 (6) (2023): 917鈥927.

  • 4

    Laura Weidinger, John Mellor, Maribeth Rauh, et al., 鈥,鈥 arXiv (2021); Emily M. Bender, Timnit Gebru, Angelina McMillan-Major, and Shmargaret Shmitchell, 鈥淥n the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big? 馃鈥 in FAccT 鈥21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (Association for Computing Machinery, 2021), 610鈥623; Karen Hao, Empire of AI: Dreams and Nightmares in Sam Altman鈥檚 OpenAI (Penguin Press, 2025); and Committee on Artificial Intelligence and Academic Professions, (American Association of University Professors, 2025).

  • 5

    Lisa Messeri, Placing Outer Space: An Earthly Ethnography of Other Worlds (Duke University Press, 2016); and Lisa Messeri, In the Land of the Unreal: Virtual and Other Realities in Los Angeles (Duke University Press, 2024).

  • 6

    Molly J. Crockett, Xuechunzi Bai, Sayash Kapoor, et al., 鈥淭he Limitations of Machine Learning Models for Predicting Scientific Replicability,鈥 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 120 (33) (2023): e2307596120; Lisa Messeri and Molly J. Crockett, 鈥淎rtificial Intelligence and Illusions of Understanding in Scientific Research,鈥 Nature 627 (8002) (2024): 49鈥58; and Molly J. Crockett and Lisa Messeri, 鈥,鈥 Trends in Cognitive Sciences 30 (3) (2025): 203鈥215.

  • 7

    Emily M. Bender and Alex Hanna, The AI Con: How to Fight Big Tech鈥檚 Hype and Create the Future We Want (HarperCollins, 2025).

  • 8

    Messeri and Crockett, 鈥淎rtificial Intelligence and Illusions of Understanding in Scientific Research鈥; and Molly J. Crockett, 鈥淢odern Maxims for an AI Oracle,鈥 Nature Machine Intelligence 7 (1) (2025): 4鈥5.

  • 9

    Bender, Gebru, McMillan-Major, and Shmitchell, 鈥淥n the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots鈥; and Messeri and Crockett, 鈥淎rtificial Intelligence and Illusions of Understanding in Scientific Research.鈥

  • 10

    Crockett and Messeri, 鈥淎I Surrogates and Illusions of Generalizability in Cognitive Science.鈥

  • 11

    Christopher Barrie, Alexis Palmer, and Arthur Spirling, 鈥,鈥 working paper (accessed March 17, 2026).

  • 12

    Robert K. Merton, 鈥淭he Normative Structure of Science,鈥 in The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, ed. Norman W. Storer (University of Chicago Press, 1979), 267鈥278.

  • 13

    danah boyd and Kate Crawford, 鈥淐ritical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon,鈥 Information, Communication & Society 15 (5) (2012): 662鈥679.

  • 14

    Messeri and Crockett, 鈥淎rtificial Intelligence and Illusions of Understanding in Scientific Research.鈥

  • 15

    Joseph Bak-Coleman, Cailin O鈥機onnor, Carl Bergstrom, and Jevin West, 鈥,鈥 arXiv (2025); and Meredith Whittaker, 鈥淭he Steep Cost of Capture,鈥 Interactions 28 (6) (2021): 50鈥55.

  • 16

    Messeri and Crockett, 鈥淎rtificial Intelligence and Illusions of Understanding in Scientific Research鈥; Joseph D. O鈥橞rien, Hannah Rubin, Kekoa Wong, and Sina Fazelpour, 鈥淓pistemic Monocultures and the Effect of AI Personalization,鈥 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 47 (2025); and Qianyue Hao, Fengli Xu, Yong Li, and James Evans, 鈥,鈥 arXiv (2024).

  • 17

    Bail, 鈥淐an Generative AI Improve Social Science?鈥; Michael C. Frank, 鈥淥penly Accessible LLMs Can Help Us to Understand Human Cognition,鈥 Nature Human Behavior 7 (11) (2023): 1825鈥1827; and 鈥,鈥 Centre of Language and Speech Technology, Radboud University (accessed March 17, 2026).

  • 18

    boyd and Crawford, 鈥淐ritical Questions for Big Data鈥; and Lauren Klein, Meredith Martin, Andr茅 Brock, et al., 鈥,鈥 arXiv (2025).

  • 19

    Bak-Coleman, O鈥機onnor, Bergstrom, and West, 鈥淭he Risks of Industry Influence in Tech Research鈥; and Janet Vertesi and J. Nathan Matias, 鈥,鈥 in CSCW 鈥23 Companion: Companion Publication of the 2023 Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing, ed. Casey Fiesler, Loren Terveen, Morgan Ames, et al. (Association for Computing Machinery, 2023), 401鈥404.

  • 20

    Merton, 鈥淭he Normative Structure of Science.鈥