亚色影库app

An open access publication of the 亚色影库app & Sciences
Fall 2025
Conclusion

It Can Happen Here

Author
Matthew Evangelista
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Matthew Evangelista is the President White Professor of History and Political Science (Emeritus) at Cornell University. He is the author of six books, including Allied Air Attacks and Civilian Harm in Italy, 1940鈥1945: Bombing Among Friends (2023), Gender, Nationalism, and War: Conflict on the Movie Screen (2011), and Law, Ethics, and the War on Terror (2008).

As we suggested in the introduction, the question that motivated this volume concerned the relationship between U.S. wars and the quality of American democracy, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent global war on terror. We wondered about both the positive and negative effects of the period of 鈥渇orever war,鈥 post-9/11. Did military service, for example, promote equality and diversity and boost the socioeconomic prospects of minority and immigrant communities? What were the costs and benefits of military spending for the overall economy, as well as its impact on income inequality? We sought to explore the evident negative effects of this era鈥檚 preoccupation with terrorism and war, such as suspicion of and discrimination against Muslim Americans at home; a congressional blank check for military intervention abroad in the form of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force; the politicization of the armed forces, including regional and partisan divides within the military; and the economic consequences (including hidden and long-term costs) of funding endless war without raising (and instead often decreasing) taxes.

This work was inspired in part by the extensive emerging literature in political science on democratic 鈥渂acksliding,鈥 but also by the impression that scholars working on that topic had little to say about war or its influence. Several months into Donald Trump鈥檚 second administration, for example, a conference at Cornell University in May 2025 brought together many of the leading figures in the American Democracy Collaborative, including Robert C. Lieberman, one of the authors in this volume, to discuss the impact of political divisions and cleavages on U.S. democracy. But the topic of war and militarization did not arise.1 The same is true of the collaborative鈥檚 most recent comparative work on global challenges to democracy produced by government scholars at Cornell.2 This absence is somewhat surprising, considering how popular culture has long linked militarism and war with threats to democracy鈥攆or instance, in dystopian novels from Sinclair Lewis鈥檚 It Can鈥檛 Happen Here (1935) to Philip Roth鈥檚 The Plot Against America (2004). The lack of attention to this topic is also notable because the four factors that scholars have identified as key components of democratic backsliding鈥攅xcessive executive authority, restrictions on who constitutes the political community, increasing economic inequality, and political polarization鈥攁re linked to war and militarization, at least in the United States. In these concluding remarks, I elaborate on these links with reference to the essays in this volume and to antidemocratic developments during the early period of Trump鈥檚 second presidency.

The growth of executive authority provides a key instrument for undermining democratic norms and institutions. In their presentation of the eponymous 鈥渇our threats鈥 to democracy in their 2020 book, political scientists Suzanne Mettler and Robert C. Lieberman connected the exertion of U.S. executive power to war, particularly to the war in Vietnam.3 They also addressed other issues throughout U.S. history that linked war to democratic decline: the Alien and Sedition Acts, the intermittent threat of civil war in the early years of the republic, the Bonus Army crisis of the 1930s, the expansion of executive power during World War II and the Cold War, and the creation of the 鈥渘ational security state鈥 after 9/11. In their treatment of the first Trump administration, they explain how the president benefited from the resources and executive authority accumulated by his predecessors, including the 鈥渧ast and increasingly opaque web of intelligence operations that has unprecedented capacity to investigate, harass, spy on, and disrupt not just suspected enemies but American citizens as well, ostensibly for the purposes of finding and suppressing subversive or otherwise dangerous activity.鈥4

From the start of Trump鈥檚 second presidency, he made clear his administration鈥檚 ideological commitment to expansive executive authority. His political appointees have consistently amplified his view that a close win of a presidential election鈥攁t least in Trump鈥檚 case鈥攃onfers a mandate for the president to do whatever he chooses. In his essay in this volume, Harold Hongju Koh depicts the growth of executive power and its relationship to the 鈥渦nitary executive theory鈥 primarily in the realm of foreign affairs.5 Returning to Mettler and Lieberman, we concur with their expectation that the president would rely on the vast resources of the executive branch for domestic policies as well, to confront internal political enemies he deems dangerous to America. As Trump self-referentially put it, 鈥淗e who saves his country does not violate any law.鈥6

The second Trump administration is showing that a U.S. president with authoritarian inclinations can wield executive power to exacerbate the other three threats to democracy: namely, by enforcing exclusionary definitions of citizenship, increasing income inequality, and promoting political polarization. By signing executive orders and co-opting a Republican-dominated legislature and Supreme Court, Trump has employed the first threat鈥攅xcessive executive power鈥攖o carry out policies that embody the other three, starting with limitations on who belongs to the political community. As the American Democracy Collaborative authors explain, 鈥渄emocratic backsliding in the modern world often starts with the unwinding of a consensus about who is a 鈥榯rue鈥 citizen and whose voice should legitimately be heard in democratic politics.鈥 They describe how Trump 鈥渃apitalizes on the idea of a 鈥榬eal鈥 American people under threat from outsiders entering the country.鈥7 War might not be a prerequisite for such exclusionary policies, but it is striking how often in U.S. history anti-immigrant measures were connected to ongoing wars and how frequently these efforts evoked the language of national security.8

Even though U.S. military activity in the two major post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has wound down, Trump avails himself of the powers accreted to the presidency during that period, as well as the rhetoric of war, to carry out mass deportations. He has expanded the already extensive presidential power over immigration to refashion American society to conform to his nostalgic vision of a white, male-dominant, Christian nation by expelling immigrants, including those convicted of no crimes. His main instrument for deportation is Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), founded in 2002 along with its parent agency, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The department received an additional $170.7 billion through H.R. 1, Trump鈥檚 鈥渙ne big beautiful bill,鈥 passed on July 4, 2025. The ICE share, $74.8 billion, is higher than most countries鈥 military budgets, while the portion of its funding allocated to building new detention centers鈥$45 billion鈥攔ivals the budget of the entire federal prison system, as discussed in the essay by Jacob Swanson and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein in this volume.9

The United States has experienced several periods of anti-immigrant sentiment, including when the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 was used to deport radicals and anti-war activists such as Emma Goldman during World War I, and when it was used to justify the mass internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, some five thousand U.S. residents of Muslim or Middle Eastern background were rounded up as suspected terrorists and held in detention or deported without due process or access to lawyers or family members.10 These abuses were carried out during wartime. Trump鈥檚 innovation is to invoke the metaphorical language of war in peacetime, as he did by denouncing 鈥渋nvasions鈥 of immigrants during his presidential campaigns. The Alien Enemies Act as written provides no justification for his actions, however. As Koh explains in his essay, the Trump administration invoked the law 鈥渢o dispatch alleged members of a Venezuelan drug cartel to El Salvador . . . even though that law does not authorize government immigration enforcement against a claimed drug cartel, which is not a 鈥榝oreign nation or government,鈥 carrying out an 鈥榠nvasion鈥 or 鈥榩redatory incursion鈥 required to trigger the statutory authority.鈥11 In a recent opinion piece, law professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Laurence H. Tribe have also argued that 鈥渂y invoking the Alien Enemies Act, the government claims it can circumvent the usual procedures for deportation, including due process.鈥12

Even in the best of times, those usual procedures provide rather weak due-process protections, given the courts鈥 deference to claims that immigration is the president鈥檚 foreign-policy prerogative. A case in point is Trump鈥檚 arrangement with president of El Salvador Nayib Bukele to fly Venezuelan immigrants in the United States to Bukele鈥檚 country, where they are imprisoned as terrorists in the notorious Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo (CECOT, or Terrorism Confinement Center) prison. Trump defied court orders not to send them, as well as a district court judge鈥檚 ruling that he should 鈥渇acilitate and effectuate鈥 the return of one man鈥擪ilmar Abrego Garc铆a鈥攚ho the government acknowledged was deported by mistake. The judge in this case asserted that Abrego Garc铆a鈥檚 鈥渃ontinued presence in El Salvador, for obvious reasons, constitutes irreparable harm鈥 (he had fled gangs in El Salvador and was then imprisoned with hundreds of suspected gang members) and ordered that the government 鈥渞estore him to the status quo.鈥 The Supreme Court seemingly endorsed the judge鈥檚 decision to effectuate Abrego Garc铆a鈥檚 return, but provided the Trump administration a big loophole, consistent with the judicial branch deference to executive authority described by Koh and by Shirin Sinnar in their contributions to this volume.13 As the justices claimed, 鈥淭he intended scope of the term 鈥榚ffectuate,鈥 . . . is, however, unclear and may exceed the District Court鈥檚 authority. The District Court should clarify its directive, with due regard for the deference owed to the executive branch in the conduct of foreign affairs.鈥14 Conducting foreign affairs at his White House meeting with Bukele in April 2025, President Trump nodded in agreement as the Salvadoran president told reporters that 鈥渙f course鈥 he would not return Abrego Garc铆a.15 The administration subsequently arranged his release from the Salvadoran prison and return to the United States only to have Abrego Garc铆a arrested and held in detention in Tennessee on various criminal charges of dubious credibility.16

Trump made little distinction between deporting legal immigrants on unsubstantiated charges of terrorism or criminal activity and extending the same treatment to citizens born in the United States. Here we see an effort, combined with Trump鈥檚 executive order to eliminate the 鈥渂irthright citizenship鈥 enshrined in the Constitution鈥檚 Fourteenth Amendment, to exclude native-born Americans from the political community. U.S. citizens had been caught up in Trump鈥檚 mass deportations from the start鈥攁 consequence of haste, willful incompetence, and the lack of due process or any kind of oversight.17 In his April 2025 meeting with Bukele, Trump made clear that he had now set his sights on U.S.-born citizens: 鈥淗omegrown criminals next,鈥 he said. 鈥淵ou gotta build about five more places.鈥18 The analysis of the prison- and military-industrial complexes by Swanson and Katzenstein in this volume provides a valuable framework for understanding how Trump could carry out his plans.19 He had already hired out CECOT reportedly for $6 million. The next step would be to privatize the operation, dispensing funds from ICE鈥檚 generous budget. Blackwater founder Erik Prince put forward a proposal to 鈥渉andle the logistics of gathering 鈥100,000 of the worst criminal offenders鈥 from U.S. prisons, holding them at a 10,000-person detention camp and flying them to El Salvador.鈥 According to an article in Politico, the 鈥減roposal includes sample language for a 鈥楾reaty of Cession鈥 so that a portion of the prison complex can become U.S. territory, arguing that 鈥榯ransferring a prisoner to such a facility would not be an Extradition nor a Deportation,鈥欌赌 so there would be no need to meet ICE鈥檚 already low standards of evidence to justify seizing and deporting people.20

Trump鈥檚 funding of ICE comes in the same bill, H.R. 1, that boosts military spending substantially and transfers a fortune in tax breaks to the ultra-wealthy ($4.6 trillion over ten years) while depriving low-income citizens of Medicaid benefits, nutrition subsidies (food stamps), and student loans.21 In his analysis of the bill鈥檚 consequences, journalist John Cassidy explains that the bill will 鈥渄ecrease the financial resources of households in the bottom twenty per cent of the income distribution by about seven hundred dollars a year and increase the resources of households in the top 0.1 per cent by more than a hundred thousand dollars annually,鈥 in what he calls 鈥渁 reverse-Robin Hood mechanism.鈥22 In her contribution to this volume, Heidi Peltier finds that the preponderance of theory and evidence supports the claim that military spending increases income inequality.23 Thus, in one single piece of legislation, Trump threatens democracy in two ways: by funding militarized deportations to redefine the political community in a narrow, exclusionist fashion and by directly exacerbating economic inequality.

Trump鈥檚 policies have also exacerbated the fourth threat to democracy, political polarization. He has menaced any Republican politicians who do not follow his dictates with a vow to support their opponents in primary elections, thereby ensuring compliance. He has selected Supreme Court justices whose deference to Republican preferences is consistent with, and extends beyond, the pattern that Sinnar identifies in her essay.24 Trump鈥檚 secretary of defense Pete Hegseth鈥攏ow calling himself the Secretary of War, after Trump signed an executive order renaming the Department of Defense (another abrogation of a congressional prerogative)鈥攈as sought to purge the military command of any officers suspected of disloyalty to the Trump ideology. His words and deeds exacerbate the partisan divide that Heidi A. Urben describes in her essay on civil-military relations.25 In a way that Katharine M. Millar鈥檚 essay helps us understand, Hegseth has also done his part to reinforce a white, masculinist norm for military leadership by firing senior Black and female officers and anyone he deems 鈥渨oke.鈥26

In September 2025, Hegseth summoned hundreds of senior officers from around the world to Marine Corps Base Quantico in Northern Virginia. He claimed that diversity within the armed forces was responsible for U.S. military failures since World War II and he denounced 鈥渢he insane fallacy that 鈥榦ur diversity is our strength.鈥欌 Women, he asserted, should be held to the 鈥渉ighest male standard,鈥 and 鈥渋f that means no women qualify for some combat jobs, so be it.鈥27 After listing by surname the military leaders appointed by Democratic presidents whom Donald Trump had fired, Hegseth called the members of his captive audience 鈥済reat Americans.鈥 鈥淏ut,鈥 he added, 鈥渋f the words I鈥檓 speaking today are making your heart sink, then you should do the honorable thing and resign.鈥

President Trump invited himself to the Quantico meeting and spoke after Hegseth. He began with a comment on the total silence that met Hegseth鈥檚 remarks鈥攁 tribute to the military leaders鈥 effort to resist the secretary鈥檚 partisan tone: 鈥淚鈥檝e never walked into a room so silent before.鈥 He urged the audience to 鈥渏ust have a good time. And if you want to applaud, you applaud.鈥 The generals remained stone-faced, as Trump delivered what The Economist called a 鈥渘akedly partisan speech.鈥 Trump assailed the 鈥渞adical left Democrats鈥 and 鈥淪leepy Joe Biden鈥 for incompetence, for an increased crime rate, and for welcoming criminals from Congo and Venezuela into the United States. Trump partially credited the armed forces for his electoral victory: 鈥淲e did really great, and part of it is because of our success with the military, the rebuilding of the military, the vote that I got from the military.鈥28 Even if the officers remained unmoved, the Quantico speeches offered further evidence of the Trump administration鈥檚 contribution to narrowing the political community and to partisan polarization.

Linking the literature on democratic backsliding to the wars of the post-9/11 era does not encompass the entire relationship between militarization and growing authoritarian rule in the United States. The Trump administration has invoked national security to justify other antidemocratic practices that go well beyond the four threats described in the literature. They include efforts to control the internal governance and content of academic research at universities and to cancel the visas of foreign students. Trump has recruited Secretary of State Marco Rubio to bar students from receiving visas if their political views are seen as harmful to U.S. foreign policy. In March 2025, R眉meysa 脰zt眉rk, a Turkish PhD student at Tufts University, was surrounded on the street in her neighborhood in Somerville, Massachusetts, by six plainclothes agents, later revealed to be ICE, and driven away in an unmarked car. Accused of no crime, she nevertheless ended up in an ICE detention facility in Louisiana.29 Apparently, she had caught the attention of a vigilante organization called Canary Mission for having coauthored an article in the student newspaper that cited credible reports of Israel鈥檚 鈥渄eliberate starvation and indiscriminate slaughter of Palestinian civilians and plausible genocide鈥 in the course of the war in Gaza that was launched following the Hamas terror attacks of October 7, 2023.30 Canary Mission鈥攁n anonymously run and funded organization known for making false charges (including against one of the present guest editors)鈥攄enounced 脰zt眉rk for engaging in 鈥渁nti-Israel activism.鈥31 Although the State Department acknowledged it could find no evidence that she supported Hamas or terrorism, it authorized her arrest anyway.32 It has subsequently revoked hundreds of student visas on similarly shoddy grounds, without formally informing their universities.

A key contention of Koh鈥檚 essay is that all three branches of the U.S. government share responsibility for the demise of constitutional checks and balances that threatens U.S. democracy. We saw an example of this in April 2025, when a U.S. judge accepted the administration鈥檚 justification for deporting Columbia University student Mahmoud Khalil. As an article in The Guardian described, 鈥淭he decision sides with the Trump administration鈥檚 claim that a short memo written by the secretary of state, Marco Rubio, which stated Khalil鈥檚 鈥榗urrent or expected beliefs, statements or associations鈥 were counter to foreign policy interests, is sufficient evidence to remove a lawful permanent resident from the United States.鈥 Despite Rubio鈥檚 undated memo鈥攖he core evidence submitted by the government鈥攃ontaining 鈥渘o allegations of criminal conduct,鈥 Judge Jamee Comans 鈥渞uled that Rubio鈥檚 determination was 鈥榩resumptive and sufficient evidence鈥 and that she had no power to rule on concerns over free speech.鈥 She added, 鈥淭here is no indication that Congress contemplated an immigration judge or even the attorney general overruling the secretary of state on matters of foreign policy.鈥33

The Trump administration鈥檚 attempts to criminalize speech and employ the tools of foreign policy and immigration to do so were revealed in a social media promotion posted by ICE (even if officials claimed it had been done in error): 鈥淚f it crosses the U.S. border illegally, it鈥檚 our job to STOP IT: PEOPLE, MONEY, PRODUCTS, IDEAS.鈥34 In the spirit of protecting the country against ideas, the United States ordered 鈥渃onsular offices to significantly expand their screening processes for student visa applicants, including through comprehensive social media investigations, to exclude people they deem to support terrorism.鈥35

At an April 2025 hearing in Boston鈥檚 federal district court, government lawyers exposed the Trump administration鈥檚 view that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the rights of free speech and free assembly of 鈥渁liens,鈥 even noncitizens legally residing in the United States. ICE鈥檚 boast to ban 鈥渋deas鈥 was not made in error, after all. The case pitted the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and additional claimants against Marco Rubio and other government officials for violating the First Amendment by arresting students such as Khalil and 脰zt眉rk for exercising free speech.36 The presiding judge was eighty-four-year-old William G. Young, appointed by Ronald Reagan in 1985 to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He asked Trump鈥檚 lawyers whether they 鈥渁gree that a noncitizen lawfully in the United States has the same constitutional rights under the First Amendment as a citizen?鈥 At first, Victoria Santora, one of the lawyers, argued correctly that 鈥渢he First Amendment does refer to 鈥榩ersons,鈥 and that people in the United States share the same rights under the First Amendment.鈥 She then asked 鈥渢o add one qualification to my answer to the question you posed at the beginning. I apologize if I misspoke earlier. But I do want to say that there are nuances to the First Amendment.鈥

鈥淟ike what?鈥 Judge Young asked.

鈥淚鈥檓 sorry?鈥

鈥淟ike what? What are the nuances?鈥

鈥淭he nuance,鈥 Santora tried, 鈥渋s that this context involves issues of national security, foreign policy, immigration enforcement.鈥

Two weeks later, the government鈥檚 concluding statement left no doubt: 鈥淭he answer to the question of whether aliens and citizens have equivalent rights under the First Amendment is no.鈥37 In particular, aliens鈥攊ncluding foreign-born university professors and students鈥攍ack the right to criticize Israel for policies of destruction and starvation of the civilians in Gaza if the government deems such criticisms evidence of antisemitism and support for Hamas terrorism.

The Trump administration鈥檚 broad definition of what constitutes terrorism is perhaps the clearest legacy of the two decades of continuous war addressed in this volume. Already during the administration of George W. Bush, courts began applying terrorism statutes to extend the prison sentences of animal-rights and environmental activists who damaged property, even if they harmed no people.38 As Sinnar recounts, during the Biden administration, prosecutors in Georgia used a new domestic terrorism law to charge more than forty people demonstrating against the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center (colloquially known as 鈥淐op City鈥 in the press and discussed in this volume by Azadeh N. Shahshahani and Sof铆a Ver贸nica Montez), to elevate 鈥渢respassing, vandalism, or other property crimes to offenses with steep penalties.鈥39 In the wake of protests from 2016 to 2017 by the Standing Rock Sioux tribe and environmental activists against the Dakota Access Pipeline, Sinnar writes that 鈥渆lected officials in at least thirty states introduced legislation to curb protests of oil and gas pipelines, including by defining protest-related activity as terrorism.鈥40 In March 2025, critics of Elon Musk鈥檚 enabling of Trump鈥檚 authoritarian takeover carried out demonstrations and boycotts against his Tesla electric car company鈥檚 dealerships. When some protests resulted in vandalism, Trump vowed that the perpetrators would 鈥済o through hell.鈥41 His attorney general Pam Bondi accordingly charged three suspects with 鈥渄omestic terrorism鈥 and threatened them with jail sentences of twenty years.42 The practice of invoking terrorism charges against political opponents is a clear legacy of the war on terror and an evident connection between war and the demise of U.S. democracy.

Perhaps the most direct link between militarization and the demise of democracy in the United States came with Trump鈥檚 deployment of troops against Americans on U.S. soil and his threats and use of violence against political opponents. A few days before staging the $30 million military parade in Washington, D.C., to celebrate the U.S. Army鈥檚 two hundred and fiftieth anniversary on June 14, 2025 (Trump鈥檚 seventy-ninth birthday), the president gave a speech at the Fort Bragg military base. The audience of soldiers, almost exclusively male, had been vetted for physical appearance (鈥渘o fat soldiers鈥 a note to one unit prescribed) and political allegiance (discouraging attendance if 鈥渟oldiers have political views that are in opposition to the current administration,鈥 according to another note). During the speech, Trump criticized and ridiculed the media and Democrats, as 鈥渟oldiers roared with laughter and applauded Trump鈥檚 diatribe鈥 in what Military.com called 鈥渁 shocking and rare public display of troops taking part in naked political partisanship.鈥43 In a rambling hour-long speech, Trump described the protesters against the ICE raids in Los Angeles as a 鈥渧icious and violent mob鈥 of 鈥渞ioters bearing foreign flags with the aim of continuing a foreign invasion of our country.鈥 He invoked California Governor Gavin Newsom and Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass in his remarks, drawing boos from his selected audience of soldiers. 鈥淭hey鈥檙e incompetent,鈥 he said, 鈥渁nd they paid troublemakers, agitators, and insurrectionists.鈥44

Trump鈥檚 mention of insurrection was intentional. In June 2020, during his first term, he had asserted his right to deploy troops under the Insurrection Act of 1807 in response to protests against the police murder of George Floyd. Most legal authorities, including Harold Hongju Koh, judged that the circumstances did not permit overriding the statutory posse comitatus ban on using military forces for civilian law enforcement on U.S. territory, although there were others, such as legal scholar and former deputy assistant attorney general John Yoo, who disagreed. Yoo, author of the 鈥渢orture memos鈥 defending the United States鈥 use of torture in the war on terror on the grounds of expanded executive authority during wartime, suggested that the courts would support Trump鈥檚 action.45 In 2020, military authorities balked at the prospect of using soldiers against civilians and talked the president out of it. On the first day of his second term, however, Trump issued an executive order declaring an emergency on the border with Mexico that 鈥渞equires use of the Armed Forces,鈥 describing the situation as an 鈥渋nvasion鈥 and granting the secretary of defense authority to deploy forces accordingly at his discretion.46 Particularly controversial was Trump鈥檚 claim that he can deploy the armed forces against the wishes of local civil and police authorities. In the case of Los Angeles, both Governor Newsom and Mayor Bass rejected the deployment, which is why his heaping scorn on those elected officials before an appreciative audience of soldiers was so concerning. In response, a former member of George W. Bush鈥檚 Defense Department claimed that 鈥淲hat worries me most are the normalization of political involvement by troops, and novel and expansive interpretations of executive power,鈥 as Trump described the military deployment to Los Angeles as 鈥渢he first, perhaps, of many.鈥 He warned other cities that might become the sites of anti-ICE or anti-Trump protests, 鈥渢hey鈥檙e going to be met with equal or greater force than we met right here.鈥47

Less than two months later, Trump ordered military forces and federal law officers onto the streets of Washington, D.C., including eight hundred National Guard troops, and took control over the district police. In this case, the deployment did not respond to, but rather provoked, protests. Trump justified the deployment as necessary 鈥渢o rescue our nation鈥檚 capital from crime, bloodshed, bedlam, and squalor,鈥 even as violent crime there hit a thirty-year low. When district police and masked ICE agents set up a traffic checkpoint, stopping cars for minor violations and questioning drivers about their immigration and citizenship status, spontaneous protests broke out among passersby.48 Such actions, justified on grounds of security, exacerbate political polarization (some protestors yelled, 鈥淕o home, fascists!鈥) and represent a further aggrandizement of executive authority.

In his speech at Quantico in September 2025, Trump invoked 鈥渢he enemy from within鈥 to justify the deployment of troops to Washington, D.C., and blamed George Soros and the 鈥渞adical left鈥 for funding 鈥渋nsurrectionists.鈥49 He then ordered National Guard troops to Portland, Oregon, and Chicago, Illinois, against the objections of both states鈥 governors and with uneven opposition from the courts. Trump鈥檚 decision to deploy troops from 鈥渞ed,鈥 Republican-majority states to 鈥渂lue鈥 cities governed by Democrats demonstrated his intention to pursue partisan political objectives to the point of violence鈥攅specially given evidence that the presence of the troops provoked and exacerbated violence, rather than containing it. He again vowed to invoke the Insurrection Act. 鈥淲e have an Insurrection Act for a reason,鈥 Trump said. 鈥淚f I had to enact it, I鈥檇 do that if people were being killed and courts were holding us up, or governors or mayors were holding us up.鈥50

The aspiration for democracy was present at the founding of the United States. In many respects, and despite major setbacks, democratic norms, institutions, and practices have been functioning and expanding overall, with occasional regressions, since then. The rule of law has often provided a basis for expanding rights or seeking redress if those rights have been violated. Like any living organism, democracy thrives in some conditions and suffers in others. This volume on war and democracy has explored how more than two decades of war and military preparations in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have contributed to the deterioration of U.S. democratic norms and institutions. Links between war and immigration, dating to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 and the Insurrection Act of 1807, provide the historical context and ready pretexts for would-be authoritarian rulers to restrict the rights of citizens and noncitizens alike.

War and militarization exacerbate all four threats that scholars of democratic backsliding have identified: executive aggrandizement, narrowing the definition of who belongs to the political community, economic inequality, and political polarization. Most worrying of all is that the system of constitutional checks and balances established with the founding of the republic might prove inadequate to stem the demise of American democracy. Scholars of democracy and authoritarianism have recently introduced the concept of 鈥渄emocratic resilience鈥 as a way to measure democracies鈥 capacity to resist the 鈥渁utocratization鈥 of political systems that has characterized the period since the 1990s. As with the kindred literature on democratic backsliding, there is little mention of the impact of war or preparation for war.51 By contrast, a group of scholars in Europe, concerned about the impact of remilitarization precipitated by the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the growing danger of nuclear war, have highlighted the connections between the strength of democratic institutions and national security. They stress the risks of military spending that comes at the expense of social welfare and robs resources from efforts at combating climate change and economic inequality. Paradoxically, militarization can render states less secure, making them vulnerable to 鈥渉ybrid warfare鈥 and other forms of external intervention, as well as domestic efforts to stoke political polarization and inflame anti-immigrant and xenophobic sentiment to make way for authoritarian rule.52

Preparing for and fighting wars can hollow out democratic institutions and weaken democratic norms, as this volume has suggested. Bolstering democratic resilience requires countering the four threats to democracy by containing executive power, expanding the political community, and reversing economic inequality and political polarization鈥攁ll the while recognizing the risk that endless war poses to democratic survival.

Endnotes

  • 1鈥淔rom Political Divisions to Regime Threat? American Democracy and Cleavages in Comparative Perspective,鈥 American Democracy Collaborative Conference, Cornell University, May 16鈥17, 2025. The only partial exception to addressing the topic of war and militarization came when Theda Skocpol presented her paper, 鈥淗ow Immigration Flashpoints Have Fueled Partisan Polarization and Republican Radicalization in Recent U.S. Politics,鈥 observing that the latest wave of immigration included refugees from wars in the Middle East and elsewhere.
  • 2Valerie J. Bunce, Thomas B. Pepinsky, Rachel Beatty Riedl, and Kenneth M. Roberts, eds., Global Challenges to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives on Backsliding, Autocracy, and Resilience (Cambridge University Press, 2025). A notable exception to scholars neglecting to address the relationship between war and the rights essential to democracy is Sidney Tarrow, War, States, and Contention: A Comparative Historical Study (Cornell University Press, 2015).
  • 3Suzanne Mettler and Robert C. Lieberman, Four Threats: The Recurring Crises of American Democracy (St. Martin鈥檚 Press, 2020).
  • 4Ibid., 222鈥226.
  • 5Harold Hongju Koh, 鈥Concentration of Power in the Executive,鈥 顿忙诲补濒耻蝉 154 (4) (Fall 2025): 69鈥86.
  • 6Doina Chiacu, 鈥,鈥 Reuters, February 16, 2025.
  • 7Kenneth M. Roberts, Valerie J. Bunce, Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Rachel Beatty Riedl, 鈥淕lobal Challenges to Democracy: Backsliding, Resiliency, and Democratic Theory,鈥 in Global Challenges to Democracy, ed. Bunce, Pepinsky, Riedl, and Roberts, 22.
  • 8David D. Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (New Press, 2003); and Tarrow, War, States, and Contention. Even the right-wing, anti-immigrant populists in Europe who seemingly invoke only the metaphor of 鈥渋nvasion鈥 are nevertheless responding to a refugee crisis intrinsically linked to two decades of U.S. wars in the Middle East and South Asia and antiterrorist operations in Africa.
  • 9Lauren Gambino, 鈥,鈥 The Guardian, July 2, 2025; and Jacob Swanson and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, 鈥From the Battlefield to Behind Bars: Rethinking the Relationship between the Military- & Prison-Industrial Complexes,鈥 顿忙诲补濒耻蝉 154 (4) (Fall 2025): 295鈥311.
  • 10Cole, Enemy Aliens; and Adam Hochschild, American Midnight: The Great War, a Violent Peace, and Democracy鈥檚 Forgotten Crisis (Mariner Books, 2022).
  • 11

    Koh, 鈥淐oncentration of Power in the Executive.鈥

  • 12Erwin Chemerinsky and Laurence H. Tribe, 鈥,鈥 The New York Times, April 9, 2025.
  • 13

    Koh, 鈥淐oncentration of Power in the Executive鈥; and Shirin Sinnar, 鈥The Supreme Court & the Unaccountable Racialized Security State,鈥 顿忙诲补濒耻蝉 154 (4) (Fall 2025): 106鈥121.

  • 14Kimberly Wehle, 鈥,鈥 The Hill, April 14, 2025 (emphasis added).
  • 15Alexandra Hutzler and Laura Romero, 鈥,鈥 ABC News, April 14, 2025.
  • 16Josh Gerstein and Kyle Cheney, 鈥,鈥 Politico, July 23, 2025.
  • 17Mar铆a Luisa Pa煤l, 鈥,鈥 The Washington Post, April 5, 2025; and Julia Preston, 鈥,鈥 The New York Review of Books, March 30, 2025.
  • 18Michelle Stoddart, 鈥溾,鈥 ABC News, April 14, 2025.
  • 19

    Swanson and Katzenstein, 鈥淔rom the Battlefield to Behind Bars.鈥

  • 20Dasha Burns and Myah Ward, 鈥,鈥 Politico, April 11, 2025.
  • 21U.S. House of Representatives, , H.R. 1, 119th Cong. (2025).
  • 22John Cassidy, 鈥,鈥 The New Yorker, July 7, 2025.
  • 23Heidi Peltier, 鈥The Relationship between Military Spending & Inequality: A Review,鈥 顿忙诲补濒耻蝉 154 (4) (Fall 2025): 192鈥213.
  • 24

    Sinnar, 鈥淭he Supreme Court & the Unaccountable Racialized Security State.鈥

  • 25Heidi A. Urben, 鈥Politicization of the Military: Causes, Consequences & Conclusions,鈥 顿忙诲补濒耻蝉 154 (4) (Fall 2025): 214鈥230.
  • 26Katharine M. Millar, 鈥Gender, Sexuality, Warfighting & the Making of American Citizenship Post-9/11,鈥 顿忙诲补濒耻蝉 154 (4) (Fall 2025): 258鈥273; and Bill Duryea, 鈥溾,鈥欌赌 Politico, May 25, 2025.
  • 27The full transcript of the speech is available on the recently renamed war.gov website. See 鈥,鈥 September 30, 2025. See also John Ismay, 鈥,鈥 The New York Times, October 2, 2025; and Greg Jaffe, 鈥,鈥 The New York Times, September 30, 2025.
  • 28The Economist, 鈥,鈥欌赌 September 29, 2025. There does not seem to be a readily available official transcript of Trump鈥檚 rambling remarks, but a transcribed recording can be viewed at 鈥,鈥 Roll Call (accessed October 20, 2025).
  • 29

    Meher Ahmad, 鈥,鈥 The New York Times, March 27, 2025; and Lexi Lonas Cochran, 鈥,鈥 The Hill, March 27, 2025.

  • 30Rumeysa Ozturk, Fatima Rahman, Genesis Perez, and Nicholas Ambeliotis, 鈥,鈥 The Tufts Daily, March 26, 2024.
  • 31Canary Mission, 鈥,鈥 last modified February 6, 2025. Canary Mission鈥檚 website accused Matthew Evangelista of 鈥渄emonizing Israel鈥 for remarks he made in a 2009 panel on international law. He had pointed out that Hamas members who engage in terrorism do not benefit from the protections afforded to soldiers, and therefore 鈥渞isk being treated as common criminals engaging in murder.鈥 The website characterized the remark as 鈥渆xpressing concern鈥 for terrorists. See Canary Mission, 鈥,鈥 last modified June 23, 2025.
  • 32John Hudson, 鈥,鈥 The Washington Post, April 13, 2025.
  • 33Oliver Laughland, 鈥,鈥 The Guardian, April 11, 2025.
  • 34

    Dan Gooding, 鈥,鈥 Newsweek, April 10, 2025.

  • 35Joseph Gedeon, 鈥,鈥欌赌 The Guardian, March 28, 2025.
  • 36, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, No. 1:25-cv-10685 (D. Mass. March 25, 2025).
  • 37Charlie Tyson, 鈥溾 The Chronicle of Higher Education, July 29, 2025.
  • 38For an example of animal rights activists, see United States v. Thurston, No. 6.06-cr-60069, (D. Or. May 21, 2007), memorandum opinion, discussed in Matthew Evangelista, Law, Ethics, and the War on Terror (Polity Press, 2009). For an example of environmental activists, see Jeff Barnard, 鈥,鈥 The Seattle Times, May 24, 2007.
  • 39

    Sinnar, 鈥淭he Supreme Court & the Unaccountable Racialized Security State鈥; and Azadeh N. Shahshahani and Sof铆a Ver贸nica Montez, 鈥Colonialism Turned Inward: Importing U.S. Militarism into Local Police Departments,鈥 顿忙诲补濒耻蝉 154 (4) (Fall 2025): 274鈥294.

  • 40

    Sinnar, 鈥淭he Supreme Court & the Unaccountable Racialized Security State,鈥 112鈥113.

  • 41Tom Espiner, Theo Leggett, and Lucy Hooker, 鈥,鈥欌赌 BBC News, March 12, 2025.
  • 42Mike Wendling, 鈥,鈥 BBC News, March 20, 2025.
  • 43Konstantin Toropin and Steve Beynon, 鈥,鈥 Military.com, June 11, 2025. On the cost of the parade, see Filip Timotija, 鈥,鈥 The Hill, July 23, 2025.
  • 44Donald Trump, 鈥,鈥 June 10, 2025, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Senate Democrats. For analyses of his remarks, see Fintan O鈥橳oole, 鈥,鈥 The New York Review of Books, July 24, 2025; Missy Ryan and Jonathan Lemire, 鈥,鈥 The Atlantic, June 10, 2025; and Linda Kinstler, 鈥,鈥 The New York Review of Books, June 17, 2025.
  • 45Harold Hongju Koh and Michael Loughlin, 鈥,鈥 American Constitution Society Issue Brief, September 2020; and John Yoo and Robert Delahunty, 鈥,鈥 Newsweek, June 3, 2020.
  • 46The White House, 鈥,鈥 January 20, 2025.
  • 47Luke Broadwater, 鈥,鈥 The New York Times, June 11, 2025. The quotation comes from Kori Schake in the Broadwater article cited here.
  • 48Chris Cameron, 鈥,鈥 The New York Times, August 7, 2025; Michael Birnbaum and Perry Stein, 鈥,鈥 The Washington Post, August 11, 2025; and Emma Uber and Lauren Morello, 鈥,鈥 The Washington Post, August 14, 2025.
  • 49Kori Schake, 鈥,鈥 Foreign Policy, October 1, 2025.
  • 50Chris Cameron, 鈥,鈥 The New York Times, October 6, 2025.
  • 51Aurel Croissant and Lars Lott, 鈥,鈥 V-Dem Institute Working Paper No. 149 (V-Dem Institute, 2024). On page 19, the authors mention the 9/11 attacks, the subsequent 鈥淕lobal War on Terrorism,鈥 and the Russian war in Ukraine as examples of 鈥渄isruptive socioeconomic transformations and global crises which should have, perhaps, triggered a resilience response,鈥 but they do not theorize a role for war or military spending per se. See also Rachel Beatty Riedl, Paul Friesen, Jennifer McCoy, and Kenneth Roberts, 鈥,鈥 World Politics 77 (1) suppl. (2025): 151鈥177.
  • 52

    Particularly valuable is a project with which this volume鈥檚 guest editors are involved, run by Mary Kaldor and Helj盲 Ossa and based at the London School of Economics. See The London School of Economics and Political Science, 鈥溾 (accessed October 20, 2025); and Conflict and Civicness Research Group, (LSE IDEAS, The London School of Economics and Political Science, October 24, 2025). Some of this project鈥檚 findings should appear in a forthcoming special issue of the journal Global Policy.